NOTES
PROPOSED ILLINOIS STATUTE ON POSSIBILITIES OF
REVERTER AND RIGHTS OF ENTRY AS
AFFECTING LAND USE POLICY
I
A recent legislative proposal in Illinois, has emphasized the anomalous character of two types of real property restrictions which receive favored judicial
treatment. The result of such treatment is the creation of serious gaps in doctrines developed by courts of equity to free land from outmoded use restrictions.
These two common law interests are the right of entry for breach of condition
subsequent and the possibility of reverter. The former gives to the grantor of
an estate on condition subsequent, or to his heirs, the option of terminating the
estate by entry on the occurrence of the designated event. 2 The possibility of
reverter upon a determinable fee, however, requires no such election; upon the
happening of the event, the estate automatically ferminates and the fee reverts
to the grantor or his heirs.3
Two developments in the United States have served to convert these "Janusfaced conveyancing devices"4 into potent weapons of land use restriction. Contingent though these interests appear to be,s American courts have held that
n~ither possibilities of reverter6 nor rights of entry 7 are subject to the rule
' Ill. S. 347, 65th Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Introduced April 30, 1947). Text cited in notes
36, 38, 39, 40, 43 and 44, infra.
2 1 Simes, Law of Future Interests § 59 (x936).
i Simes, Law of Future Interests § 177 (1936). Professor Gray's argument in Gray,
Rule against Perpetuities §§ 31-42 (iis), that such interests could not be created after the
abolition of subinfeudation by the Statute Quia Emptores, has been uniformly rejected by
American courts. The Illinois decisions are North v. Graham, 235 Il. 178, 85 N.E. 267 (i9o8);
Morton v. Babb, 251 Ill. 488, 96 N.E. 279 (1911); Regular Predestinarian Baptist Church v.
Parker, 373 Ill. 607, 27 N.E. 2d 522 (1940):
4 "They are half restriction and half estate .....
Being hybrids, they are suited for neither
purpose. The estate they create in the grantor represents 'a gambler's chance of recovering
the property,' should the condition be broken at any time in the remote future. As restrictions for the benefit of other property, they are crude weapons of the early law; their survival
indicates a cultural lag." Goldstein, Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices
to Restrict the Use of Land, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 248, 250 (1940).

• 2 Simes, Law of Future Interests §§ 5o6-7 (1936). But compare Gray, Rule against Perpetuities §§ 299, 312 (1915), calling rights of entry contingent and possibilities of reverter vested interests.
6 North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178, 85 N.E. 267 (i9o8).
7 Gray v. C., M., & St. P. Ry. Co., I89 Ill. 4oo, 59 N.E. 950 (Igo). In England, rights of
entry were declared within the rule. Re Hollis' Hospital [1899] 2 Ch. 540. This holding has
been codified as to possibilities of reverter. i5 Geo. V., c. 20, § 4(3) (1925).
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against perpetuities. In addition, the common law prohibitions against inter
vivos alienation' or testamentary disposition9 of these interests are suffering
progressive inroads by judicial decision ° and statute,", so that purchasers or
devisees may acquire such interests in many instances, although these persons
are even further removed from any genuine desire to encourage fulfillment of
the condition stipulated than are the remote heirs of the grantor.
Estates on condition have been used chiefly for three purposes: provision of
a means of summary relief for landlords upon the breach by tenants of conditions in leases, security for the payment of money or performance of services,12
and restriction on the use and enjoyment of land.3 It is in connection with the
use of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry as devices to achieve the last
purpose that the most undesirable results and the greatest adverse criticism
have appeared.14
Although armed with the same immunity from the rule against perpetuities
as restrictive covenants, possibilities of reverter and rights of entry are neither
at their inception nor in their course of existence subject to the policy restraints
8Rights of entry: Rice v. Boston & W. R. Corp., 94 Mass. 141 (i866). Possibilities of reverter: North v. Graham, 235 Il. i78, 85 N.E. 267 (19O8).

9In Illinois, decisions have recently reaffirmed the court's adherence to the common law
ban on inter vivos and testamentary alienation of possibilities of reverter. Pure Oil Co. v.
Miller-McFarland Drilling Co., 376 Ill. 486, 34 N.E. 2d 854 (1941); Regular Predestinarian
Baptist Church v. Parker, 373 Ill. 607, 27 N.E. 2d 522 (i94o). Older Illinois opinions express
the same view. Presbyterian Church v. Venable, 159 Ill. 215, 42 N.E. 836 (x896). Rights of
entry likewise have been held incapable of inter vivos transfer. O'Donnell v. Robson, 239 Ill.
634, 88 N.E. i75 (i9o9). It would seem, however, that entry rights are devisable. Gray v.
C., M., & St. P. Ry. Co., 189 Ill. 400, 59 N.E. 950 (i9o). Text writers point out the unreason-

ableness of applying to contingent remainders and executory interests rules dealing with
alienation different from those applied to possibilities of reverter and rights of entry. Carey
and Schuyler, Illinois Law of Future Interests § 76 (i94i).
10Possibilities of reverter: Irby v. Smith, 147 Ga. 329, 93 S.E. 877 (917). Rights of entry:
McKissick v. Pickle, 16 Pa. 140 (185i).
11Generally these statutes are interpreted to cover possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry by virtue of their all-inclusive authority to convey any interest in land. Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. (Baldwin, 1943) §382.010. But compare W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) §3529
which provides that "Any interest in or claim to real estate or personal property may be
lawfully conveyed or devised." It has been held that this West Virginia section does not
apply to a right of entry since it is only a right of action which cannot be transferred to a
stranger. White v. Bailey, 65 W. Va. 573, 64 S.E. ioi9 (1909). A statute typical of the more

specific acts provides that "A right of re-entry, or of repossession for breach of condition
subsequent, can be transferred." Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941) § io46.

"Numerous examples and illustrative cases are collected in Brake, Fees Simple Defeasible, 28 Ky. L.J. 424 (1940).
3 This category includes conditions requiring affirmative action with respect to the land,
such as erecting buildings or maintaining railroad facilities, as well as conditions prohibitive
in nature.
"4 Clark, Limiting Land Restrictions, 27 A.B.A.J. 737 (i94); Goldstein, op. cit. supra
note 4; Walsh, Conditional Estates and Covenants Running with the Land, 14 N.Y.U.L.Q.
Rev. 162 (i937).
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governing restrictive covenants.'5 However, the former interests may be employed to produce exactly the same results as restrictive covenants, although
the estates on condition carry a remedy in the form of a penalty of forfeiture,
instead of recourse to an action for damages or for equitable relief. By the
weight of authority, the only restrictive covenants enforceable in equity are
those secured to protect other property in the neighborhood.,6 Possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry require no such dominant tenement. If the conditions are not illegal, the "fact that such interests are in gross does not vitiate
them. Even though the qualifications governing determinable fees and estates
on condition subsequent have been imposed for the benefit of the grantor's
property, the threat of forfeiture operates in favor of the grantor or his heirs and
not in favor of the transferee of the land intended to be protected.7 Only in the
event that the grantor or his heirs are the owners of the dominant land at the
time of breach will the parties benefited by the forfeiture and the parties substantially interested in enforcement of the condition be identical.
Since most jurisdictions now refuse to enjoin breaches of restrictive covenants
when the complainant does not own land in the neighborhood of the burdened
tract, courts of equity are enabled to develop a limited policy of land use control. But the automatic operation of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry
prevents their employment as instruments of a rational land use policy. In ad'5 Rights of entry are "indistinguishable logically from conditional limitations over to
third persons." Turrentine, Suggestions for Revision of Provisions of the California Civil
Code regarding Future Interests, 21 Calif. L. Rev. X, 7-8 (1932). I Simes, Law of Future Interests § 18o (i936); Walsh, op. cit. supra note x4, at 164-65.
x6Bauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. io9, 139 Atl. 5o8 (1927); McNichol v. Townsend, 73 N.J.
Eq. 276, 67 Atl. 938 (1907).

X7I Simes, Law of Future Interests § 177 (i936). But cf. Young v. Cramer, 38 Cal. App. 2d
64, 100 P. 2d 523 (194o). The plaintiff purchased land in a subdivision from a grantor who reserved a right of entry for breach of conditions restricting the land to residential uses, it being
"understood and agreed that the foregoing conditions and restrictions are a part of a general
plan for the improvement of Tract 4642, which plan contemplates that all of the lots in said
Tract shall be used for residence purposes only ....and that said conditions and restrictions
are for the benefit of said Tract, and each and every parcel of land therein, and shall inure to
and pass with said Tract, and each and every parcel of land therein, and are hereby imposed upon the premises covered by this conveyance as a servitude in favor of said tract, and each and
every parcel of land therein as the dominant tenement or tenements." The grantor, upon
selling all the lots in the subdivision, conveyed his rights of entry to the owners of the lots in
proportion to their respective interests in the land. The plaintiff claimed title to two lots as
holder of an undivided 55o/ioooths interests in the rights of entry, although at the time of the
action the plaintiff no longer owned any subdivision property. The court held that the exercise of the right of entry was dependent upon the holder's continuance in ownership of some
part of the tract intended to be benefited. It is believed that the court's characterization of this
position as the "majority view" is to be tempered by the circumstance that the restrictions
here imposed were identical with the more usual "general plan" restrictive covenants, with the
single addition of the right of entry for breach. See also Second Church of Christ, Scientist, of
Akron v. LePrevost, 67 Ohio App. 101, 35 N.E. 2d 1015 (i94i); Stevens v. Galveston, J. & S. A.
Ry. Co., 212 S.W. 639 (1919). One writer has discussed the role of the subdivider as a "coinmercial producer" of urban land. Monchow, Use of Deed Restrictions in Subdivision Development 5-7 (1928).
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dition, according to well-established equity practice, specific enforcement of
restrictive covenants will be decreed only where coerced compliance under the
circumstances is not unreasonable, and in making the determination of reasonableness the courts will consider such factors as changes in the neighborhood and
the practical benefit to the complainant as weighed against hardship to the defendant.,' A serious objection to the possibility of reverter and the right of
entry is the unwillingness of the vast majority of American courts to apply to
the enforcement of these interests the equitable notions of the changed conditions doctrine as applied to the enforcement of covenants. Further, since breach
of restrictive covenants can be remedied by equitable enforcement, the covenant remains in effect as a protection for the benefited property. But breach of a
condition establishing a reverter or right of entry also terminates all future protection for the benefited property, since the holders of these interests receive a
fee simple absolute, shorn of all conditions. Thus the restrictive covenant, a
theoretically perpetual limitation on land use, is in practice a flexible method of
reconciling the protection of the desires of landowners with the freeing of land
from restrictions no longer adapted to the changing needs of the community.
But with only a few exceptions,9 American courts in dealing with conditions
have refused to take into account anything other than the agreement originally
made. As a result, possibilities of reverter and rights of entry are completely inflexible, operating in most jurisdictions wholly without concern for considerations of desirable land use.
s "The problem is different where a right of entry has been created. The aid of equity is
no longer required; the form of the restriction admits of a sort of legal specific performance."
Goldstein, op. cit. supra note 4, at 251. But this specific performance, it is to be noted, is not
of the condition, but of the promise to vacate the premises. Restatement, Property §§ 563-64

(1944).
'9 In a leading case the court, in upholding a forfeiture based on a right of entry reserved
against breach of a condition against sale, lease, or rental to Negroes, said by way of dictum
that "it is true that where circumstances are changed, owing to the natural growth of a city or
of the present use of a whole neighborhoodlso that the purpose of a restriction in a conveyance
no longer can be accomplished, and it would be oppressive and inequitable to give effect to
such restriction, the courts will not enforce it, whether it be a restrictive covenant to restrain
the violation of which injunction is sought, or whether it is a condition providing for a re-

entry in case of breach." Koeher v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 585, 205 S.W. 217, 221 (1918). A

line of California cases has 'carried the changed conditions doctrine over into the possibility
of reverter-right of entry situation. In one case, a declaratory judgment relieved the plaintiff's
estate of a condition subsequent relating to building line restrictions, declaring that because of
changed conditions no court would decree a reversion of the title to the grantor upon a breach
of the condition. Forman v. Hancock, 3 Cal. App. 2d 291, 3 9 P. 2d 249 (I934). This approach
had been dearly spelled out where the court refused to give effect to a racial restrictive condition, on the grounds that changes in the racial makeup of the community around the disputed
property had made maintenance of the condition ineffectual to serve its original purpose. The
court found it "needless to follow appellants' argument on the technical rules and distinctions
made between conditions, covenants, and mere restrictions ..... A principle of broad public
policy has intervened to the extent that modern progress is deemed to necessitate a sacrifice
of many former claimed individual rights." Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 588-89, 1o P.
2d 496,497 (1932). See also Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613, 2 P. 2d 782 (193i).
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II

Legislation drafted to impose restraints on possibilities of reverter and rights
of entry has assumed three general patterns: a statutory time limit imposed
in the absence of a differing time stipulation by the parties, as adopted in
Massachusetts; a prohibition against trivial conditions annexed to a conveyance, as adopted in Michigan; and a combination of the Massachusetts and
Michigan statutes, as adopted in Minnesota.
The Massachusetts statute is an undesirable solution of the problem, since
its very terms invite grantor-convenantees and grantors of estates on condition
effectively to withdraw their stipulations from the operation of the act by inserting a specific time limit.2° Apparently such a period could be any specific

number of years so that, in practical effect, all the results of unlimited restrictions or conditions could be obtained.2 On the other hand, this legislation would
appear to embody a sound philosophy when it deals with conditions and restrictions as interests essentially similar and therefore to be treated similarly."
A second solution has been attempted in a few states which have adopted
substantially identical versions of an extremely general statute. The Michigan
legislation is typical.3 The statute provides that conditions of "merely nominal"
benefit to the beneficiary are to be disregarded. One difficulty with the measure
is that its provisions do not literally apply to a situation where the condition
originally was founded on an "actual and substantial benefit," but changed
"0Conditions or restrictions, unlimited as to time, by which the title or use of real property
is affected, shall be limited to the term of thirty years after the date of the deed or other
instrument or the date of the probate of the will creating them, except in cases of gifts or
devises for public, charitable, or religious purposes. This section shall not apply to conditions
or restrictions existing on July sixteenth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, or to those contained in a deed, gift, or grant of the commonwealth." Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp., 1946)
c. 184, § 23.
21One case occasionally cited for this proposition contains only a dictum to this effect, but
the position taken is believed sound. Burke v. Metropolitan District Commission, 262 Mass. 70,
79, 159 N.E. 739, 742-43 (1928). So far as covenants are concerned, even where no time stipula-

tion has been made by the parties, the thirty-year statutory period has been held to be not of
right, but to be subject to the usual discretion of courts of equity in enforcing such covenants.
Thus, in one situation the plaintiff was held precluded from obtaining specific enforcement of a
building set-back restriction because she stood by in silence while the defendant in good faith
violated the covenant, although the thirty-year period had approximately fifteen years to run.
Loud v. Pendergast, 2o6 Mass. 122,92 N.E. 4o (I9io).
""No valid distinction-save possibly one of continuance of outworn procedural distinctions between forms of remedy--can possibly be drawn betweeen the equitable restriction
and most, if not all, of the other servitudes here involved [such as conditions, easements, profits,
rights of re-entry, possibilities of reverter, or other servitudes or restrictions]." Clark, op. cit.
supra note 14, at 74o.

23 "When any conditions annexed to a grant or conveyance of lands are merely nominal, and
evince no intention of actual and substantial benefit to the party to whom or in whose favor
they are to be performed, they may be wholly disregarded, and a failure to perform the same
shall in no case operate as a forfeiture of the lands conveyed subject thereto." Mich. Stat. Ann.
(Reis, Supp. x946), § 26.46. The same statute appears in other states. Wis. Stat. (Brossard,
1943) § 230.46; Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. 1945) § 71.123.
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circumstances have rendered the stipulated use of "merely nominal" benefit.24
While the striking down of whimsically conceived conditions would appear to be
essential in this type of legislation, the more pressing problems-and the bulk
of litigation-usually arise after an originally intelligible restriction or condition
has been subjected to the pressures of a changing community. A further objection to this legislation is its piecemeal dealing with land use restrictions; it applies literally only to estates on condition.25 It is submitted that an effective
statute should govern all contractual restraints on land use which produce
similar results.

6

2 7
The most ambitious enactment yet attempted is the Minnesota statute,
essentially a combination of the Michigan-type act and the thirty-year limit
found in the Massachusetts legislation. Whether through more clearly defined
policy or through better draftsmanship, the Minnesota legislature avoided at
least two of the loopholes and ambiguities found in other measures. First, it
expressly provided for the situation where conditions "shall become" merely
nominal. Thus, the conditions on which forfeitable estates 8 depend presumably
would be judged on the basis of considerations similar to those used in determining the granting of specific enforcement of real covenants. In addition, the
legislature elminated the virtually self-defeating option found in the Massa24Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314, 22 N.W. 8x6 (1885), construed the Michigan statute.

Whether the plaintiffs could, after parting with all their holdings in the vicinity, take advantage of a condition subsequent prohibiting the use of liquor on the granted premises was a
question expressly reserved by the court.
2s The Michigan statute has been applied without discussion to the case of a residential restrictive covenant. Baxter v. Ogooshevitz, 205 Mich. 249, 171 N.W. 385 (igig). The same
application was made later in another decision. Stahl v. Dyer, 235 Mich. 355, 2o9 N.W. 107
(1926). Only one case has come before the courts involving the Wisconsin statute. Pepin
County v. Prindle, 61 Wis. 301, 22 N.W. 254 (1884) (condition subsequent). The Arizona
statute has not thus far been involved in litigation.
"While comprehensive treatment of all such restraints, legal and equitable, seems essential,

it is recognized that practical political considerations governing the enactment of such legislation may dictate a narrower treatment. This note does not consider problems arising in connection with easements, profits, or licenses, because it is primarily directed toward an examination of currently proposed Illinois legislation. This omission should not be considered as an
indication that such problems are not of real concern in this field.
27 Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1946) § 8075: "(a) Whenever any conditions annexed to a
grant, devise or conveyance of land are, or shall become, merely nominal, and of no actual
and substantial benefit to the party or parties to whom or in whose favor they are to be per-

formed, they may be wholly disregarded; and a failure to perform the same shall in no case

operate as a basis of forfeiture of the lands subject thereto. (b) All covenants, conditions, or
restrictions hereafter created by any other means, by which the title or use of real property is
affected, shall cease to be valid and operative thirty years after the date of the deed, or other
instrument, or the date of the probate of the will, creating them; and after such period of time
they may be wholly disregarded. (c) Hereafter any right to re-enter or to repossess land on
account of breach made in a condition subsequent shall be barred unless such right is asserted
by entry or action within six years after the happening of the breach upon which such right is
predicated."

28 The first paragraph of the statute would seem by construction to apply only to determinable fees and estates on condition subsequent. Goldstein, op. cit. supra note 4, at 255-56.
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chusetts statute by making the thirty-year limit mandatory, and not merely an
official substitute in the absence of private agreement.
Legislation dealing with land use restrictions should recognize the fact that
the refusal of most American courts to apply the safeguards developed in connection with covenants to the possibility of reverter and right of entry probably
is attributable to legal conceptions which ignore the similarity in function between forfeitable estates and covenants. Thus, most courts, in dealing with
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, apparently have felt themselves
concerned solely with a property relationship, while in the covenant cases the
typical approach has considered the duties of a promissory obligation. The very
allegations contained in the pleadings in the two types of cases29 appear to have
moved courts in the direction of narrowing the scope of policy considerations
deemed pertinent in the possibility of reverter and right of entry actions. When
it is recognized, however, that forfeitable estates, essentially, are more drastic
methods of obtaining compliance with contractual restraints on the use of land,
these differences in rationale appear to be the result of a lag in legal analysis
which not even the conservative law of real property should continue to tolerate.
Legislation decreeing the enforcement of estates on condition only as equitable servitudes should satisfy parties beneficially interested in maintenance of
the prescribed use or restriction when such estates on condition are employed
merely to compel a certain use of servient land. The well-established practice
of enjoining breaches of negative covenants has been enlarged in most American
jurisdictions to include the specific enforcement of affirmative covenants as
well.3°The harsh effects of forfeiture involved in reverter clauses and reserved
rights of entry would seem to be easily and equitably avoided by specific enforcement of the condition.31 Where the condition governing a possibility of
reverter or right of entry is merely in gross, the same rule should apply. Here
the condition would have a maxmur duration of the life of the grantor, and in
2
any event would be enforceable only between the original parties.3
Comprehensive legislation governing possibilities of reverter and rights of
29 In substance, the possibility of reverter and right of entry allegations state "This is
my land" while the covenant allegations claim that "The defendant promised."
.o Neponsit Property Owners Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 278 N.Y.
248, I5 N.E. 2d 793 (1938). Walsh, Equity § ioo (930); 3 Tiffany, Law of Real Property,
§ 859 (Jones ed. 1939).
3'Express exception of determinable fees and estates on condition subsequent granted for
charitable, educational, or religious purposes from the operation of such legislation may be
thought desirable. An argument in favor of such an exemption is that the policy in favor of
encouragement of such gifts outweighs any detriment suffered from the stagnating effects of
these restrictions.
32"It is very clear that an equitable restriction running as a servitude with the land conveyed does not arise when the covenantee does not retain ownership of neighboring land, so
that no dominant estate exists. Though enforceable at law and possibly in equity as a personal contract between the original parties, such restrictions cannot run as burdens upon the
land conveyed for the personal benefit of the covenantee when no easement, legal or equitable,
is created for the benefit of a dominant estate." Walsh, Equity § ioo (293o).
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entry might well establish an additional rule, relating to covenants as well as to
the forfeitable estates, placing a definite time limit on the operation of these
qualifications on title.a3 A relatively certain method of determining what use
can legally be made of land at any given time, without the necessity of resorting
to the courts, appears to be as essential to systematizing the law of land use
restrictions as the assimilation of rules governing estates on condition to general
equitable considerations. In Illinois, although time-limit provisions apparently
could be made retroactive in the case of possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry, constitutional difficulties probably would bar this action in the case of
3
covenants. 4
InI
Problems arising from possibilities of reverter and rights of entry are being
considered by the Illinois legislature. judged by the considerations outlined
above, the proposed Illinois legislationS requires some revision. Section 136 is
merely a restatement of the common law as to alienability of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry. But if these interests are to become covenants in essence, as is believed desirable, alienability of the estates on condition will not be
the crux of the problem. Rather, transferability of the protected estate will be
the prime consideration. The mischief caused by possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry cannot be cured, as attempted in the proposed Illinois statute
by prohibiting their transfer while, at the same time, allowing descent to the
37
heirs of the grantor.
Section 2,38 apparently inserted to clarify the status of trustees and cestuis
under the terms of Section i, would be unnecessary if possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry were to be enforced only as servitudes.
33 "Legislation should be supplemented by a direct and simple provision upon which the
conveyancer and title searcher can rely without extensive investigation or court proceedings, by which the title of the servient land is made wholly free after a period of years."
Clark, op. cit. supra note 14, at 739.
34 See notes 41 and 42 infra and accompanying text.
35111. S. 347, 65 th Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Introduced April 3o, 1947).
36 "Section i. No possibility of reverter or right of entry or re-entry for breach of a condition subsequent is alienable or devisable; and no conveyance thereof made after the effective
date of this Act shall operate in favor of the grantee, or persons claiming under him, by estoppel, inurement of title, or operation of Section 7 of an Act entitled 'An Act Concerning Con-

veyances,' approved March

29,

1872,

as amended."

37 In spite of the fifty-year limit in Section 4, is set out in note 4o infra, all of the difficulties
outlined above would still be present if the designated condition happened within the period.
For example, the grantor may have transferred the protected land to a third person, but upon
the breach of condition within the fifty-year time limit, the estate would revert to, or be subject to entry by, the grantor or his heirs, who, it is submitted, have slight moral claim to it.
39 "Section 2. At the termination of trust, however effected, any possibility of reverter and
any right of entry or re-entry for breach of condition subsequent heretofore or hereafter reserved by or to the trustee and affecting land in this State ceases and determines as to the
trustee but shall, at such termination, pass to the person or persons who receive the assets of
the trust.'!
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The draftsmanship of Section 339 is questionable. The provision may be
sound when the condition is imposed for the benefit of a business which is being
discontinued. But termination of the possibility of reverter or right of entry
upon dissolution of a corporation may be unwarranted if such dissolution is
either part of a reorganization proceeding or is the forerunner of continuation
of the business under a non-corporate form of enterprise.
Irrespective of the desirability of the time limits provided in the next two
sections,4° a serious constitutional difficulty might be created in some states in
connection with the retroactive operation of the statute in invalidating preexisting interests in land. However, this problem probably will not arise in
Illinois. A line of Illinois cases dealing with possibilities of reverter arising out of
statutory dedication of streets has established the position that these interests
may be dealt with by the legislature free from "any constitutional limitation."4'
If possibilities of reverter are not estates and may therefore be subjected to the
summary treament indicated, a fortiori rights of entry, which require not only
breach but election to enter as well, should b6 amenable to the same legislative
handling. So far as covenants are included in time-limit legislation of this kind,
however, express negation of retroactivity as to them is believed essential.y
39 "Section 3. When a corporation is dissolved or ceases to exist, any possibility of reverter
and any right of entry or re-entry for breach of a condition subsequent heretofore or hereafter
reserved by or to the corporation and affecting land in this State ceases and determines."
4o"Section 4. Neither possibilities of reverter nor rights of entry or re-entry for breach
of condition subsequent, whether heretofore or hereafter created, where the condition has not
been broken, shall be valid for a longer period than fifty years from the date of the creation of
the condition or possibility of reverter. If such a possibility of reverter or right of entry or
re-entry is created to endure for a longer period than fifty years, it shall be valid for fifty years.
"Section 5. If by reason of a possibility of reverter created more than fifty years prior to the
effective date of this Act, a reverter has come into existence prior to the time of the effective
date of this Act, no person shall commence an action for the recovery of the land or any part
thereof based upon such possibility of reverter, after one year from the effective date of this
Act.
"If by reason of a breach of condition subsequent created more than fifty years prior to
the effective date of this Act, a right of re-entry has come into existence prior to the time
of the effective date of this Act, no person shall commence an action for the recovery of the
land or any part thereof based upon such right of entry or re-entry after one year from the
effective date of this Act, unless entry or re-entry has been actually made to enforce said right
before the expiration of such year."
41People ex rel. Franchere v. Chicago, 321 Ill. 466, 476, 152 N.E. 141, 144-45 (1926).
'Prior to the act in question .... nothing remained in the dedicator but a mere possibility
of reverter. This possibility, not being an estate, was not protected by any constitutional
limitation, and it was competent for the legislature to abolish this possibility of reverter or
to change the devolution of title upon the happening of the future contingency in any way it
saw fit and .... any legislative enactment to that end is not unconstitutional." Ibid. Another
Illinois opinion stated that "the possibility of reverter in the streets which remains in a dedicator after the making of a statutory plat .... is not an estate and is not protected by any
constitutional limitation .... it is perfectly competent for the legislature to abolish this
possibility of reverter or to change the evolution of title upon the happening of the future contingency in any way it may see fit." Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 fll. xg, 36, X32 N.E. 280, 287

(1921).

42Both the Massachusetts and Minnesota statutes, notes 2o and
tion of their thirty-year limit to subsequently created interests.

27

supra, restrict opera-
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But since pre-existing equitable interests of this type would remain subject to
the controls involved in their specific enforcement, though they might outlast
the statutory limit, they would not do so if courts of equity deemed their enforcement inequitable.
Section 643 appears to be a sound realization of the limitations of legislation
dealing with possibilities of reverter and rights of entry. Certainly the use of
these instruments in the enforcement of leasehold promises does not produce
the grossly inequitable results caused by their use in grants of fees. Nor need
such legislation deal with the highly developed law of mortgages, where the
safeguards devised to protect mortgagors and the security nature of the transaction render the problems greatly different from those involved in the Illinois
proposal."4
THE LIQUIDATION OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP
INTERESTS-A FEDERAL TAX PROBLEM
Tax problems raised for shareholders concerned with liquidating their entire
interests in a corporate enterprise have been complicated by failure of Congress
and the courts to recognize the existence of a distinct, identifiable business decision which requires consistent treatment regardless of the particular method
employed to accomplish disinvestment, of the capital used in the business.
Basically, three alternative methods of disposal are available to the sellers of a
corporate business. The conventional method of disinvestment is a statutory
proceeding in liquidation and dissolution by which the corporation, usually
through trustees, sells its assets and then distributes the proceeds to its share43 "Section 6. This Act does not invalidate or affect (3) a conveyance made for the purpose
of releasing or extinguishing a possibility of reverter or right of entry or re-entry:
(2) A right of entry or the transfer of a right of entry for default in payment of rent reserved in a lease or for breach of covenant contained in a lease, where such transfer is in connection with a transfer of a reversion and the rent reserved in the lease.
(3) A right of entry or the transfer of a right of entry for default in payment of a rent granted
or reserved in any deed or grant, or for breach of any covenant in any deed or grant where a
rent is granted or reserved, where such transfer is in connection with a transfer of a rent so
granted or of a rent so reserved; or
(4) Any rights of a mortgagee based upon the terms of the mortgage, or any right of a Trustee or a beneficiary under a trust deed in the nature of a mortgage based upon the terms of the
trustless deed."
44 The proposed Illinois statute concludes with a separability clause that does not require comment.
"Section 7. If any provision of this Act or the application of any provision thereto to any
property, person, or circumstances is held to be invalid, such provision as to such property,
person or circumstances shall be deemed to be excised from this Act, and the invalidity thereof
as to such property, person, or circumstances shall not affect any of the other provisions of this
Act or the application of such provision to property, persons or circumstances Other than those
as to which it is invalid, and this Act shall be applied and shall be effective in every situation
so far as its constitutionality extends."
xThe word "disinvestment" is used to mean a conversion of assets to liquid form or, as it
is sometimes expressed, a negative investment.

